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EAST V. WEST: THE UNITED STATES’ INDO-PACIFIC ECONOMIC VISION TAKES ON CHINA’S
BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
By
Jaime D. Fell
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, arbitration in China has been a controversial subject. The
government system, coupled with the private nature of the Chinese government, made
arbitration a difficult concept to take hold.1 Hong Kong and Singapore are two notable
countries that have become deeply involved in international arbitration.2 Both countries
are now classified as international arbitration hotspots.3 However, China, the country
with the most powerful economy in Asia, has been slow to embrace arbitration.4
China’s family-run business empires and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which
were adverse to trans-border commercial ventures, made China hesitant to join the
international arbitration scene.5 The traditional beliefs held by family-run businesses and
SOEs focused on confidential and face-to-face negotiations that “saved face.”6 However,
as China, and Asia in general, became more involved in the international community,
these countries saw their businesses grow and integrate.7 The increase in intra-Asian and
Asian trans-border relations with other countries, saw Asian countries begin to embrace
arbitration.8
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Arbitration has since taken hold in Asia. In recent years, the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission has reported the largest number of
international arbitrations in the world.9 China has realized the benefits of international
arbitration that have been lamented by Europe and the United States: (1) a neutral forum
compared to national courts, (2) more confidentiality compared to national courts, and (3)
the ease of award enforcement in arbitral proceedings compared to court judgments.10
Additionally, China’s recent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an economic undertaking of
great ambition, has made arbitration a necessity for the Chinese government.11
China’s aggressive overseas development policies have prompted the United
States to respond with a development program of their own, albeit several years later.12
The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision is an aggressive investment initiative by the United
States government to combat the extensive and powerful reach of China’s BRI.13
China has come a long way in arbitration, while the United States has already
embraced the practice. The two investment and development initiatives by the two world
powers are going to have a major effect on international arbitration. Countries that have
not utilized arbitral agreements may be thrust into the international arbitration scene.
Additionally, the two initiatives can highlight and potentially help solve longstanding
disputes that China and the United States have with each other, and with other
countries.14 Finally, with the unprecedented amount of arbitral proceedings that are likely
to follow from the two initiatives, international arbitration hubs like Singapore and Hong
Kong may become overwhelmed, prompting a need for more countries to step up and
assist with the overload.15
A. China’s Belt and Road Initiative
China’s President Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013.16
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The initiative is of unprecedented proportions, with the focus being on using the
enormous foreign currency reserves that China has generated through trade surpluses to
finance investment and infrastructure developments across Europe and Southeast Asia.17
The name of the initiative comes from the ancient “Silk Road” land routes and the
ancient sea routes linking the Middle East and Europe.18 The result is intended to be a
railroad linking China to Europe through Russia, and commercial seaports connecting
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.19 The investments are being made
in the areas of energy, mining, industrial innovations, and agriculture.20
The total BRI investments in 2017 were $890 billion with President Xi promising
an additional $124 billion in that year.21 There were over 600 BRI contracts signed by
parties through 2017.22 Additionally, fifty SOEs were participating in roughly 1,700
projects through the BRI.23 Investments aside, Chinese corporations had made
approximately $64 billion in corporate acquisitions through the BRI.24
Chinese corporations have the central role in all planning and implementation of
BRI projects, as well as managing the resulting facilities.25 Chinese banks are also the
central focus of all financing of BRI projects, with additional assistance from foreign and
international banks.26 Finally, most of the project construction is being completed by
Chinese construction companies.27 Although the Chinese are at the center of all BRI
projects, they are not exclusive to the Chinese.28 All third world countries are welcomed,
and even encouraged, to participate in the projects. For example, Hong Kong and
Singapore have already become active in developing roles, particularly in the realm of
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international finance and arbitration.29 Additionally, Japan and GE Financial Services30
have recently become involved in BRI projects.31 The involvement of third party
countries added to the already impressive expertise on BRI projects, but also spreads the
financial risk for those parties involved.
As of 2018, BRI projects require an estimated US five trillion dollars of capital.32
The BRI also involves sixty-five different countries, totaling sixty-five per cent of the
world’s population.33 The involvement of sixty-five different countries, over 600
contracts and counting signed, and the vast amount of capital required for the projects,
the international arbitration community has begun to feel the effects of such an
initiative.34 As the contracts mature, the projects grow, and more capital is required, the
effect of the initiative has will only continue to have an impact on all parties involved.
B. The United States’ Indo-Pacific Economic Vision
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision
Initiative on July 30.35 The plan outlines how the United States will attempt to become a
key economic player in Asia. Becoming economically involved in Asia is a significant
challenge faced by both former presidents George Bush and Barack Obama.36 President
Obama attempted to solve the problem by the creating the controversial Trans-Pacific
Partnership, which was ultimately undone by current president Donald Trump.37 The
major difficulty is balancing the vast economic power, and high economic and trade
standards, of the United States with many of the lower standards Asian countries adhere
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to.38 The economic imbalances between the two geographic areas makes it difficult for
United States’ policies to take hold in Asia.39 The economic imbalance also highlights the
difficulties that budget constraints have on American corporations attempting to establish
themselves in Asia.40 For example, many Asian countries are not developed economically
to the point where they can sustain the United States investment strategies.41
Pompeo stated that investment is to become a pillar of President Trump’s strategy
in Asia.42 The United States' plan is to increase the financial support in Asia through a
proposed agency, the United States International Development Finance Corporation.43
Direct government investment will receive $113 million.44 The current global spending
cap is to be doubled to $60 billion and invested in the development finance corporation,
which is used to provide private companies loans to embark on projects overseas.45
Additional money will be divided up to expand United States’ technology in Asia
($25 million), and assisting countries in storing their energy resources and boosting
infrastructure ($50 million combined).46 The Indo-Pacific Economic Vision includes a
trilateral investment agreement with Japan and Australia, a $350 million investment deal
to develop new sources of clean water with Mongolia, and an agreement to invest
millions in projects within Sri Lanka through the Millennium Corp, a development
agency of the United States’ government.47
Although the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision does not compare to China in terms
of amounts of money; the United States believes the quality of their investments will
make them considerably more competitive in Asia.48 One of the primary critiques of the
BRI is the lack of focus on Asian countries, however, the United States believes they can
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fill that gap.49 By focusing on countries in Asia that are seemingly forgotten by the BRI,
most notably, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the United States believes they
can help establish a stronger rule of law in those countries and create a foothold in Asia
that will benefit all of the countries in the area.50
II. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA’S OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
IMPACTING ARBITRATION

AND

INVESTMENT

A. Contracts and Agreements being a Necessity for both Initiatives to Utilize
Arbitration has become the preferred method of dispute resolution for BRI
projects in contracts.51 Arbitration is preferred as it minimizes the risk of “(1) resolving
disputes in potentially less favorable local courts on the BRI and/or (2) being unable to
enforce an award or judgment once obtained.”52
The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) has been the mainstay
for arbitral disputes arising out of BRI projects to date for many reasons, including its
maintenance as a pro-arbitration state and its location along the route of many of the BRI
countries.53 Therefore, Hong Kong is a good example of how contracts and agreements
will be utilized by the BRI. Since the BRI began, HKIAC has already handled a
significant amount of BRI cases.54
To make the HKIAC a fairer forum for BRI disputes, the HKIAC now allows
parties to choose their arbitrator, or arbitrators.55 The list of arbitrators is not limited to
arbitrators already on a panel or to the HKIAC’s list of maintained arbitrators.56 China
has worked with the HKIAC to allow for reciprocal recognition of monetary judgments
in regards to final arbitration awards and enforcement.57 The pro-arbitration steps taken
49
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by the HKIAC allows parties involved in BRI contracts to arbitrate their disputes in a
neutral forum, knowing that the decision rendered will be respected and enforced by
China.58 Without arbitration clauses in contracts, the BRI would likely not be possible
because of the complex contract disputes arising between international parties.
International arbitration is essentially the only means to settle international
disputes.59 Because of arbitration’s importance, the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision will
need to follow the example set out by the BRI, which is to find a neutral arbitral forum to
solve disputes and implement a forum selection clause into the arbitration agreement.60 If
the United States intends for their private corporations to enter into agreements with
business entities in Asia, they will need to make use of arbitration clauses as these clauses
have worked effectively with BRI project contracts.
B. Contract Maturation Creating a Significant Caseload for Arbitral Institutions
Sarah Grimmer, secretary general of the HKIAC, warned those involved with the
BRI to “be prepared to see a lot more business disputes on projects linked to China’s
‘Belt and Road Initiative.’”61 This is because most contracts arising out of similar
initiatives typically occur during the first year.62 Grimmer stated that between the two to
five year mark is when disputes typically arise from those contracts.63 The BRI was
announced in 2013, and roughly five and a half years into the initiative, the number of
disputes continues to rise.64
Contracts are constantly being made, withdrawn from, and disputed. These
contract issues have kept the HKIAC busy. In 2014, the HKIAC dealt with 252
arbitration matters arising out of BRI projects, in 2015 they dealt with 271, and in 2016,
the disputes totaled 262.65 Many of these disputes involved jurisdictional issues and trade
cases involving minerals and materials required for BRI projects.66 The HKIAC has yet
to deal with an issue arising out of public disputes which occur when a BRI project has
58
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gone wrong.67 It is only a matter of time, however, before an issue directly concerning a
BRI project makes its way into the HKIAC, which is likely to be an extremely complex
issue.68
Adding to the caseload will be the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. The initiative
was announced during the summer of 2018.69 Within the first year, the Indo-Pacific
Economic Vision will likely see many contracts arising out of agreement with Asian
parties. If the same holds true for the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision contracts as held true
for BRI projects, disputes are likely to arise within the next one to four years.70
Arbitration experts expect that in the next ten years the BRI alone will increase
the number of arbitral proceedings occurring, not only within the HKIAC, but other
arbitral institutions in Asia.71 With the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision expecting contract
disputes to arise from their parties within that same time frame, the HKIAC, and other
Asian arbitral institutions, may become heavily burdened.72 To alleviate some of the
expected caseload a solution is required. Predicting the uptick in contract disputes gives
participating countries time to choose an alternative, non-Asian institution for their
contracts.73
C. The Initiatives Furthering International Arbitration in Asian Countries that have
been Hesitant to Embrace Arbitration
The embracement of international arbitration has been a slow process in Asia.
Aside from Singapore and Hong Kong, many other Asian countries view arbitration with
some skepticism. This skepticism is likely the result of two major components. First,
some Asian countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and
numerous others, are considered developing countries, as they have been slow to develop
economically.74 It is difficult for developing countries to become major players in
international arbitration because these countries lack the funds and institutions to conduct
67
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international arbitral proceedings properly.75 Additionally, developing countries tend to
lack the rule of law required for arbitration to take hold.76
The nature of select Asian governments is the second major reason for
international arbitration struggling to take hold in Asia. Again, this is prevalent in the
developing Asian countries. These particular countries tend to see power switch hands
frequently, with each new power being leery of the concept of arbitration.77 Arbitration
thrives on freedom and privacy, something that leaders of small, developing countries
fear as a threat.78
Both the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision can potentially counter the
issues international arbitration faces in Asia. The introduction of both Chinese and United
States investment can bring funds to the developing countries that can then be used to
create proper arbitral institutions and further develop their economy, thereby combatting
the development issue.79 Parties seeking an arbitral forum for proceedings through BRI
and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision investment opportunities will find developing
arbitral institutions and creating stronger economies attractive.80
The same solution can be used to solve the rule of law issue. The economic
opportunities that the initiatives will create can counter the leeriness of leaders in
developing countries.81 If leaders of developing Asian countries are willing to sacrifice
some power to bring economic opportunities to their countries, international arbitration
can thrive in those countries.82
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III.

THE INITIATIVES IMPACTING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN A POSITIVE MANNER
A. Arbitration Venues in Asia and Around the World will be Incentivized to
Improve their Arbitral Forums to Attract Parties of the BRI and the Indo-Pacific
Economic Vision

With a large number of contracts being made through the BRI, and the IndoPacific Economic Vision creating potential arbitration agreements, the need for
appropriate venues will continue in Asia. Singapore and Hong Kong are already
international arbitration hubs, but with the vast number of potential arbitral disputes, the
two countries may not be enough. A desirable venue has three main criteria: (1) the local
laws support arbitration and the courts will not interfere or hinder the arbitral process; (2)
the host country of the arbitral proceeding is a part of the New York Convention which is
crucial for award enforcement; and (3) logistical support for the proceeding will be
provided, such as translation, proper facilities, and proper access to the country for the
proceeding.83
Hong Kong and Singapore have already established the three criteria of a
desirable arbitral venue. Each country has a well-established legal system, which
supports arbitration, enforces awards, has proper facilities, and has logistical support.84
Additionally, arbitral decisions rendered in Hong Kong and Singapore are recognized by
China, making the two venues desirable and crucial for the BRI and the Indo-Pacific
Economic Vision.85 Many other countries in Asia are members of the New York
Convention, such as: Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam,
and several others. However, many of these countries fail one of the other desired
criteria.86 The logistical support is lacking in many Asian countries, as many do not have
proper translation support and dedicated arbitration centers.87 On top of failing to meet
the three criteria, these countries lack the experience desired by parties seeking an arbitral
forum.88 Even fewer countries have records of awards rendered that were enforced
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elsewhere.89 In their current state, these countries do not make extremely attractive
arbitral forums.90
The presence of the United States and China will prompt these countries to take
the final step and improve their arbitral venues, which will make them attractive to
parties.91 More arbitration proceedings will give these countries the experience in
international arbitral proceedings that they crucially need. The result will be improved
international arbitration in Asia, which will improve international arbitration.
B. Arbitral Institutions Around the World will need to Improve to Handle the
Number of Disputes that will Arise from the two Initiatives
Hong Kong and Singapore are desirable arbitral institutions for parties, because
the parties know that the proceeding will be handled fairly and the award will be
enforced. Although the HKIAC and SIAC will likely soak up many of the arbitral
proceedings that arise under the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision, the two
institutions will unlikely be able to handle the potential proceedings.92 Unless other
institutions can rise and make themselves attractive to international parties, the lack of
attractive institutions will put a major strain on both the BRI and the Indo-Pacific
Economic Vision.
Because the BRI is an initiative that spreads throughout Europe, the BRI will have
more flexibility than the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. London, Paris, Geneva,
Stockholm, and New York are all traditional venues that are favorable to arbitration. The
greater access of the BRI will lead to the International Chamber of Commerce, London
Court of International Arbitration, International Center for Dispute Resolution,
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, or the Permanent Court of Arbitration to handle
many of the arbitral proceedings that arise under the BRI.93 All of these institutions have
extremely desirable venues, and the institutions residing within have vast experiences
dealing with complex international arbitration issues.94 Greater access to additional
institutions opens up possibilities for contracts under the BRI, but severally limits the
capabilities of contracts under the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. The BRI, being the
larger initiative, will make it difficult for the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision to seek the
desirable HKIAC and SIAC in Asia.
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China’s desire to keep the United States out of the geographical location adds to
the United States’ problem of trying to find an appropriate arbitral institution in Asia.95
As two of the world leaders, China and the United States have a tense relationship.96
Among many concerns,97 China will likely try to block the United States out of Asia and
halt the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision by ensuring that most of their contracts have
clauses prompting arbitration in Hong Kong or Singapore.98 Because China will prefer
arbitrating in Asia, as opposed to Europe, alienating the United States in Asia becomes a
viable strategy.
The United States will have the ability to arbitrate proceedings in New York.99
However, many Asian parties may be hesitant to leave Asia, and come to the United
States, to arbitrate disputes.100 Furthermore, because the BRI is the larger initiative, and is
likely to have a greater impact on the economy of the respected Asian countries, those
countries may be more likely to adhere to China and the BRI, as opposed to the IndoPacific Economic Vision.
C. Geopolitical Conflicts will be Stimulated which will help Alleviate Tension
Between Adverse Countries
Many countries that are off-putting, or even hostile, to either China or the United
States may find themselves entering arbitral agreements to benefit both countries due to
the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision. Potential agreements can lead to
discussions that would otherwise not have occurred.
The United States has had a rocky history in Asia. Some countries, such as South
Korea and Japan, have become some of the United States’ closest allies. Others, such as
China and Vietnam, have strained relationships with the United States. The Indo-Pacific
Economic Vision is an attempt by the United States to open themselves up to Asia and
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the economies that reside within.101 The initiative can help combat the rough history that
the United States has had with these countries and attempt the build a relationship that
can benefit both countries. Many Asian countries fall on the lower end of the world
rankings based on their economies.102 The United States consistently ranks near the top,
giving many of the less developed Asian countries a chance to engage with a world
economic power.103 The United States will utilize the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision to
attempt to invest and develop within these countries.104 Although the history between the
United States and some Asian countries has been strained in the past, the initiative gives
the countries a chance to reconcile those differences, set aside political differences, focus
on the future, and help develop an economic relationship that can aid both countries well
into the future.
The same argument can be made between China and many European countries,
and, also, other countries in Asia. China, and some European countries have had tense
relationships. Furthermore, China has had a tense history with some Asian countries such
as South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, predominantly due to the conflict in the South
China Sea.105 The BRI could have a similar political effect that the Indo-Pacific
Economic Vision will likely have with the United States and some of its historical
adversaries.106 However, the BRI is likely to have a greater impact because it is a
significantly larger initiative and countries may be more inclined to participate for the
potential economic benefits. Examples of the BRI’s advantage are already showing, as
BRI projects have found their way into Japan.107
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IV.

THE CHALLENGES THE INITIATIVES WILL FACE AND POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACTS
A. Political Ramifications may Arise Between Countries due to the Competitive
Nature of the two Initiatives

Although the United States and China may be able to reconcile some of their
differences with other countries through their respected initiatives, the potential
exasperation of political tension between the United States and China could occur. China
may look at the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision as an attempt by the United States to gain
control in Asia, undermine the BRI, and potentially gain influence over the South China
Sea situation.108 If China views the initiative in this manner, the conflict between the
United States and China could get much worse before it gets better.
The competition created by the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision could
create political divides between the United States, China, and the countries involved in
each respective initiative. Because many of the contracts will involve at least one Asian
party, finding a neutral forum for both parties will be difficult.109 Asian countries will
prefer Asian institutions and the United States and European countries will prefer their
respective institutions.110 The current practice indicates that parties can find a neutral
location, however, this can prove to be difficult with the initiatives because of the
political nature of the projects.111 Additionally, political tensions can be strained when
contracting parties from different countries have a dispute.
Due to the location and reputation of HKIAC and SIAC, many arbitral
proceedings will likely be conducted in Asian countries. However, the enormous amount
of money that is likely to be invested through each respected initiative can call into
question the HKIAC and SIAC, particularly if Asian parties seemingly end up on the
preferred side of the arbitral award.112
Finally, it is common BRI contract practice for each party to appoint an arbitrator
for the proceedings; the third being neutral. It is likely that the neutral arbitrator will
consistently make the final arbitral decision.113 The United States, China, and the parties
of BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision contracts will likely take issue with large
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contract disputes being decided by a small group of neutral arbitrators “ . . . operating
under the auspices of independent, non-governmental arbitral institutions.”114 When one
country feels that its parties are being shorted by neutral arbitrators, especially
concerning large-scale investment projects, political ramifications can quickly arise.

B. Determining the Applicable Law and Applying it to Complex Disputes can
Create a Large Number of Problems for Arbitral Institutions
Identifying an agreed upon choice of law provision is potentially the most
difficult issue that the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision arbitral proceedings
will experience. Countries likely to host BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision
proceedings have laws that are of recent origin and not completely fleshed out.115
Contrast this to countries, such as the United States and the many European countries,
who have laws that are old, tried, and consistently applied. Projects arising out of the two
initiatives will be dealing with common law, civil law, customary law, or sharia law.116
The acceptance and promotion of freedom of contract can combat the choice of
law problem. In the United States, freedom of contract is widely promoted, yet countries
such as China with strong government intervention prefer to maintain control of such
practices.117 If countries move towards the allowance of freedom of contract, the parties
will have the ability to compromise and choose a choice of law provision that best suits
each party.118
Allowing the freedom of contract is crucial, as it will allow arbitral institutions to
follow the choice of law provisions decided upon by the parties and apply it in the
proceeding. However, freedom of contract is not a foolproof solution, as even the most
complex and well-designed contracts cannot foresee every possible dispute that may
arise.119 Parties often purposely leave contracts open ended to allow for a more flexible
application of the law.120 Furthermore, these unforeseeable problems are likely to arise
from exceedingly complex and difficult issues that make the arbitral tribunals’ decision
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more difficult to ascertain. The confusion surrounding choice of law provisions can lead
to rulings based on undeveloped laws that may not be satisfactory to both parties.121
Identifying a choice of law provision is not a new issue for international law.
However, due to the vast number of arbitral disputes that are likely to arise out of the BRI
and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision initiatives, this issue is exasperated.
C. Overwhelming Case Loads for Asian Institutions can Lead to Poor Efficiency
and a Lack of Qualified International Arbitrators
With the United States moving quickly into Asia and China making
agreements with countries all around the world, Hong Kong and Singapore, the desirable
arbitration hubs, can quickly become overwhelmed with cases.122 The number of disputes
arising out of BRI projects is projected to increase due to contract maturation.123 Since
the BRI and the Indo-Pacific Economic Vision contracts are maturing on a consistent
basis, the increase in disputes can overrun arbitral institutions, particularly in Asia.124
Although the HKIAC and SIAC are experienced institutions and have handled the typical
yearly increase in arbitral disputes, the potentially drastic uptick in disputes arising from
the two initiatives can be too much for the institutions to predict and, eventually, handle.
Experienced institutions may potentially be able to predict the increase in arbitral
disputes.125 However, having an adequate supply of arbitrators is also a cause for concern
for the international arbitration community.126 There is a limited pool of experienced
international arbitrators, which is further limited by those who have experience dealing
with contracts of BRI size.127 Reliance on a limited pool of arbitrators can slow
proceedings and make arbitration ineffective in Asian institutions.128 The HKIAC and
SIAC can find themselves among undesirable institutions because of inefficiency arising
out of overwhelming disputes and a limited arbitrator pool.
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Simple supply and demand concepts can likely solve the problem of
overwhelming disputes and a limited arbitrator pool.129 As previously discussed, Asian
countries that are typically not engaged in arbitration or have poor institutions may find
themselves improving in these areas to attract parties to arbitral in their country.
Furthermore, there is no shortage of attorneys in the world, and a limited arbitrator pool
can be satisfied by young attorneys with knowledge of international law and a desire to
become an arbitrator.130 The result is an overall benefit for international arbitration as the
practice will see an influx of improved arbitral institutions and more young minds
entering the field.
V. CONCLUSION
The international community has yet to see an initiative the size of the Chinese
Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI is already having a substantial impact on international
arbitration due to the contracts entered into by foreign parties. With the recent
announcement of the United States’ Indo-Pacific Economic Vision, international
arbitration can change for the better. Furthermore, the initiatives will create competition
and economic opportunities for countries that have stifling economies or are in the
process of developing.
The initiatives are not without their potential problems, as tensions between the
United States and China can become strained due to competition in Asia, and conflicting
beliefs over desired arbitral forums and applicable law. Furthermore, once contracts
begin to mature, arbitral institutions can quickly become overwhelmed and experience
inefficiency due to slow proceedings and a limited arbitral pool. However, the positive
outcomes created by the two initiatives can solve the problems that may arise. The
potential economic opportunities the initiatives bring will prompt countries to improve
their arbitral institutions and more young minds to enter the field of international
arbitration. The net benefit will be a positive impact on the international arbitral
community.

129

See generally Stipanwich, supra note 127, at 362-3, 366.

130

See generally id.

218

